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More than 40 percent of Social Security beneficiaries continue to work after age 65.  This 
research investigates the extent to which these individuals substitute labor across periods 
in response to anticipated wage changes induced by the Social Security earnings test.  
While we find that a disproportionate number of individuals choose earnings within a few 
percentage points of the earnings limit, we find no evidence that these individuals 
substitute labor supply between ages 69 and 70 when, in our sample, the tax on earnings 
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1. Introduction 
The growing importance of the elderly in the U.S. workforce is the product of two well-known 
trends, the aging of the U.S. population and the leveling off of the long-term decline in male labor force 
participation at older ages.  In 2000, individuals ages 65 and above accounted for 13 percent of the U.S. 
population; by 2025 this percentage is projected to rise to 19 percent [Census 2000].  While male labor 
force participation at older ages declined over much of the 20
th century, this long-run trend toward earlier 
retirement slowed considerably in the 1980s and some argue may have reversed itself in the 1990s [Quinn 
1999; Purcell 2000].  By some estimates these two trends together imply the elderly will account for more 
than 5 percent of the total U.S. workforce in 2025 [Fullerton 1999]. 
For a variety of reasons, we might expect the labor supply of elderly workers to respond 
differently to financial incentives and non-pecuniary job characteristics than younger individuals.  
Perhaps most importantly, the overwhelming majority of elderly workers receives or is eligible to receive 
some level of guaranteed annuity income, whether it is from Social Security, private pensions, or private 
savings.  Of equal importance, the elderly are much more likely than younger workers to suffer both acute 
and chronic episodes of poor health that affect the amount and kind of work they can perform.  While 
many studies have documented the importance of these two factors in determining how individuals 
transition from full-time work to complete retirement around the early and normal Social Security 
retirement ages of 62 and 65, relatively little published work focuses on the labor supply decisions of 
those individuals who accept retirement benefits, but continue to work.  Understanding what keeps these 
individuals in the labor force is of increasing importance as the elderly population grows and the question 
of how individuals and society can maintain adequate income at older ages looms larger.   
In this paper, we use the longitudinal New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS), which surveyed a 
sample of new Social Security beneficiaries in 1982 and 1991, to explore the relative importance of 
wages in the labor supply decisions of elderly workers.  We do this in two ways.  First, we examine 
survey responses to a host of subjective questions in the NBDS regarding why individuals do or do not 
work following receipt of Social Security benefits.  Second we estimate the extent to which elderly 
workers substitute work across periods in response to changes in wages induced by the Social Security 
earnings test. 
Although a number of researchers have estimated the response of labor supply to changes in the 
Social Security earnings test  see, for example, Burtless and Moffitt (1985), Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986), Friedberg (2000), and, for Canada, Baker and Benjamin (1999)  we are aware of no study that 
has studied the effect of the earnings test using panel data.  Panel data allow us to directly estimate the 
intertemporal labor supply elasticity of elderly workers between the ages of 69 and 70 at which point the   2
effective tax rate on covered earnings falls from 50 percent to zero.  In addition, the NBDS provides 
administrative data on covered earnings.  Previous research has relied on self-reported earnings that are 
presumably measured with greater error than earnings recorded administratively.  With administrative 
data on covered earnings, we can determine precisely which individuals are constrained by the earnings 
test and so which individuals should be most likely to respond to the elimination of that constraint. 
We begin this paper in Section 2, with a review of the empirical literature on elderly workers 
including prior research on the earnings test.  We then derive from a life-cycle model of labor supply an 
empirical specification that relates changes in hours of work to changes in wages and the disutility of 
work (Section 3).  Our expression for labor supply is similar to that of Lee (2001), which is in turn 
attributable to  earlier work on life-cycle labor supply by Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981).  Our model 
is distinguished by our focus on how changes the disutility of work affect the responsiveness of elderly 
workers to changes in wages.  In Section 4, we describe the NBDS data and, in Section 5, respondents’ 
own reasons for why they do or do not work following receipt of Social Security benefits.  Section 6 
presents estimates of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity between ages 69 and 70 relying on the 
earnings test for identification, compares those estimates to those for younger workers, and explains how 
they differ from other published estimates that rely on the earnings test.  We conclude in Section 7.  
2.   Prior Research 
Only a few studies have directly examined the characteristics of elderly workers and correlates of 
their labor force participation.  Iams (1987) finds that new Social Security beneficiaries in the first wave 
of the NBDS tend to work fewer hours and for lower wages than they did prior to receiving benefits.  
Iams also finds that individuals who changed jobs following benefit receipt tend to move into service-
oriented jobs.  Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (NLSOM), Parnes and Sommers 
(1994) find that the probability of work among men ages 68 and older in 1989 is strongly correlated with 
good health and an individual’s work ethic and attitudes toward retirement measured in earlier waves of 
the NLS.  Parnes and Sommers also report a positive correlation between educational attainment and 
labor force participation and negative correlation between non-labor income and labor force participation 
in this population.  Pienta, Burr and Mutchler (1994) 1994 focus on elderly women and the strong 
positive correlation between their labor force participation early and later in life. 
Several studies have demonstrated that job characteristics affect the ability of older individuals to 
remain in the workforce.  For example, a number of studies show retirement ages are lower for 
individuals who work in physically demanding occupations [Holden 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier 
1986; Hayward and Grady 1990].   Given the long-term shift in the U.S. economy toward less physically 
demanding occupations, it is not clear how important this kind of impediment to work at older ages will   3
continue to be.  There is little evidence in general that suggests older workers are less productive in their 
work activities [Mitchell 1990].  A survey of employer attitudes found that employers rate older workers 
above average in terms of experience, judgment, commitment to quality, and attendance and punctuality 
[CED 1999, p. 29].  The same survey found, though, that older workers exhibit less flexibility and 
adaptability.   
Hurd and McGarry (1993) emphasize the likely importance of hours flexibility in determining 
labor force participation among older workers.  In a standard labor supply model, individuals choose 
hours of work given exogenously offered wages, and there are many reasons to believe that older workers 
would prefer to reduce hours gradually rather than retire all at once.  Indeed, transitioning from full-time 
to part-time employment, and frequently simultaneously to a new employer and even a fundamentally 
different job, is a common pathway to retirement for many older individuals [Hayward and Grady 1990; 
Blau 1994; Ruhm; and Hayward, Crimmins and Wray 1994; Herz 1995].   
There is considerable evidence, however, that hours and wages are offered simultaneously and so 
workers cannot simply choose hours at a given wage [Lundberg 1985; Dickens and Lundberg 1993].  
Hurd and McGarry (1993) investigate whether the ability to adjust hours within a job is correlated with 
retirement expectations.  They find that individuals who currently work in jobs where work hours can be 
reduced or their responsibilities can be lessened report a substantially higher subjective probability of 
working past age 65, even after controlling for a host of demographic, financial, and health 
characteristics.  Thus, the ability of employers to accommodate demands for flexibility may be an 
important determinant of labor supply among the elderly.  While there is no direct evidence on this point 
in the case of the elderly, several studies do show that accommodation influences the likelihood that 
individuals suffering from a temporary or permanent disability return to work as well as their earnings in 
that job [Daly and Bound 1996; Burkhauser, et al. 1999].  
Haider and Loughran (2001) present suggestive evidence from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), and March Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) that non-pecuniary factors are important in the labor supply decisions of the elderly who are 
currently working.  Labor supply in this population is concentrated among the healthiest, wealthiest, and 
most educated individuals, yet these individuals work for very low wages.  Nearly 75 percent of 
individuals ages 70 and above earn wages in the bottom quintile of the overall wage distribution of those 
ages 50-61.  Panel data suggests that declining wages with age is not due to selective retirement, but 
rather the gradual transition of individuals into part-time work with low wages.  They also find that 
transitions out of the labor force in the AHEAD population are explained in large part by declining health. 
Neumark and Johnson (1996) come to a similar conclusion in their longitudinal analysis of age-
wage profiles in the NLSOM.  Declines in wages are most pronounced at ages 62 and 65 and it would be   4
appear that a fraction of that decline is attributable to the shift from full-time to part-time employment and 
departures from career employers.  They speculate that declines in wages at these ages are also due to 
unobserved changes in worker effort due to increases in unearned Social Security income.  Neumark and 
Johnson (1996) see comparatively little decline in wages among elderly workers who do not receive 
Social Security benefits, although the select nature of that population complicates any inferences one 
might draw about the role of Social Security versus other factors in causing wage declines. 
If it is the case that older workers accept lower wages in order to gain greater flexibility in terms 
of lower hours and perhaps other job attributes, it is tempting to think that these workers may be 
unconditionally less responsive to changes in wages than younger workers.  That is, if older workers have 
a strong preference for low hours of work, then they will be less willing to substitute hours of work for 
consumption when wages rise than younger workers.  We will show, however, that this inference is at 
odds with a theoretical model of life-cycle labor supply.  Empirically, our only evidence on the labor 
supply elasticity of older workers comes from variation in wages induced by the earnings test and this 
evidence is mixed. 
The earnings test reduces Social Security benefits for affected workers whose annual earnings 
exceed the established threshold.  Although these reduced benefits are eventually refunded to workers in a 
roughly actuarially fair manner, the earnings test is nonetheless widely perceived as a pure tax on 
earnings and the empirical literature has consequently ignored this complication.  There have been many 
changes to the earnings test over the years.  During the 1980s, the earnings test covered those workers 
who were receiving retirement benefits between the ages of 62 and 69.  For these individuals, the benefits 
were taxed back at a rate of $1 for every $2 earned. This tax rate was changed to $1 for every $3 earned in 
1990.  Most recently, the earnings test was eliminated in 2000 for workers ages 65 to 69. During the 
1980s, the earnings threshold varied between $5,000 and $10,000 (in nominal terms) and reached $15,500 
before it was eliminated in 2000.
1  Some workers have earnings sufficiently high to make them ineligible 
for Social Security benefits altogether and so, for them, the marginal reduction in benefits past this point 
is zero. 
In theory, the elimination of the earnings test between ages 69 and 70 induces intertemporal 
substitution for those individuals just below or above the earnings threshold.  Unless there exist large 
fixed costs associated with working any hours, only those individuals who, at ages less than 70, chose to 
work at or above the threshold, will experience a relevant change in their marginal tax rate.  In Figure 1, 
the individual represented by indifference curve U1 works h1 hours before and after age 69 since the 
budget constraint only changes to the left of point a.  Individual 2, on the other hand, experiences a 50 
                                                      
1 See Gruber and Orszag (2000) for more detail on variation in the earnings test over time.   5
percent increase in his or her wage at age 70, inducing an unambiguous increase in hours of work (from 
h2,1 to h2,2) between ages 69 and 70, all else equal.  An unanticipated decrease in the earnings test would 
also generate income effects that would lower labor supply and so, theoretically, the labor supply 
response to unanticipated change in the earnings test is ambiguous.  
As evidence that the earnings test impacts labor supply, various authors have noted that a 
disproportionate number of workers choose earnings within a narrow range surrounding the earnings limit 
[see, for example, Vroman 1985; Burtless and Moffitt 1985; Friedberg 2000].  For example, using data 
from various years of the March CPS, Friedberg (2000) finds evidence of substantial bunching at the 
earnings threshold and that this bunching moves systematically with changes in the threshold over time. 
The implications of this bunching for the responsiveness of the elderly to wage changes are less 
clear.  Early studies [e.g., Burtless and Moffitt 1985; Gustman and Steinmeier 1986] conclude that the 
earnings test is relatively unimportant.  However, these studies relied on relatively small law changes to 
identify the impact.  Friedberg’s (2000) estimates, which rely on the 1983 elimination of the earnings test 
for workers ages 70 to 71 and the 1990 tax rate change from 50 to 33 percent, imply that eliminating the 
earnings test will raise hours of work by 5.3 percent for those currently at or above the earnings threshold.  
Friedberg’s estimates are generated by modeling labor supply responses to changes in the earnings test 
along the entire budget constraint.  Gruber and Orszag (2000) use a reduced-form approach and conclude 
that the earnings test has little overall impact.  Relying on a much different policy experiment, Baker and 
Benjamin (1999) examine the elimination of the earnings test in the Canadian public pension system.  
They find no impact on total hours worked, but they do find a substantial increase in weeks worked. 
Only Friedberg (2000) uses estimates of the responsiveness of the hours of work to changes in the 
earnings test to compute a labor supply elasticity for the affected population.  Friedberg interprets her 
estimated wage elasticity of 0.32 as an uncompensated wage elasticity, which captures both substitution 
and income effects related to changes in wages in a static model.  This elasticity is larger than most 
estimated wage elasticities for prime-age males.
2  
In the work that follows, we focus on the intertemporal wage elasticity.  The estimates of 
Friedberg (2000), Gruber and Orszag (2000) and others that use cross-sectional data do not isolate this 
particular parameter.  The NBDS, however, allows us to examine within-individual changes in labor 
supply as their budget constraint changes between ages 69 and 70.  In the following section, we examine a 
standard life-cycle model of labor supply that helps us to interpret changes in hours of work between ages 
69 and 70 and how our elasticity estimates compare to that estimated by Friedberg (2000). 
                                                      
2Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarize these estimates.   6
3.  A Model of Life-Cycle Labor Supply 
Consider a standard life-cycle model of labor supply in which an individual seeks to maximize 
the sum of expected utility, U(c,h), over T periods: 




∑  (1) 
where c is consumption, h is hours of work, and ρ is the subjective rate of discount.  The individual faces 
a budget constraint that equates the present discounted value of consumption with the present discounted 
value of labor income plus initial wealth, At:  









where W is the wage rate, r is the market rate of interest, and we assume individuals can borrow freely 
across periods.   
We can obtain a labor supply function by maximizing the utility function in Equation (1) with 
respect to hours and consumption and subject to the budget constraint of Equation (2).  Following 
previous studies [e.g., MaCurdy 1981; Lee 2001], we assume the period-specific utility function, 
  Ut(ct,ht)=Υ 1 ,t[ct]
ω1 −Υ 2,t[ht]
ω2 , (3) 
where Υ1 and Υ2 weight consumption and labor supply in the utility function and 0 < ω1 < 1 and ω2 > 1 
are time-invariant parameters.   We can think of Υ2,t as a measure of the disutility of work.  This utility 
function yields a closed-form solution for the labor supply equation (assuming the existence of an interior 
solution),  
  lnht =
1
ω2 −1














  , (4) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Equation (3) (i.e., the marginal utility of wealth).
3   
Within the lifecycle framework, there exist two different elasticities that capture how individuals 
respond to wage changes.  The first elasticity, the intertemporal elasticity, allows us to examine how 
hours of work respond to known wage changes along a given age-wage profile or, in the language of 
MaCurdy (1981), an evolutionary wage change.  The labor supply function in Equation (4) provides for a 
                                                      
3 Equation (4) is equivalent to Equation (11) in MaCurdy (1981).  Another justification for this labor supply function 
is that it is represents a log-linearization of an arbitrary labor supply function [Card 1994].   7
simple characterization of the intertemporal elasticity because the lack of income changes implies that the 
marginal utility of wealth, measured by λ, remains constant.  Thus, the intertemporal elasticity is simply, 







The intertemporal elasticity is a function only of the parameter ω2 and so is independent of time-varying 
individual characteristics like the disutility of work.  The intertemporal elasticity is the relevant elasticity 
when trying to understand how older workers will substitute labor from one period to the next in response 
to anticipated changes in wages. 
The second elasticity captures how hours of work responds to a parametric shift in the age-wage 
profile.  Individuals respond to such a shift both because the relative wage rate changes across periods 
(changes captured by the intertemporal elasticity) but also because it induces a change in the marginal 
utility of wealth.  The latter effect is expected to be negative, implying that this second elasticity will be 
less than the intertemporal elasticity.  This second elasticity is the relevant elasticity for evaluating the 
welfare effects of changes in the earnings test [Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Card 1994].  
Individuals may adjust labor supply between two periods for a variety of reasons other than 
changes in wages.  For the elderly, increasing disutility of work may be a particularly important reason 
why we observe labor supply declining with age [see, for example, Weiss 1972].  As health declines, 
work is likely to become more onerous.  The importance of rising disutility of work can be seen if we take 
first differences of Equation (4) to derive an expression for change in log hours of work: 
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    , (6) 
where the ∆t signifies a first difference (e.g. ∆th = ht+1 − ht).   Equation (6) makes clear that changes in 
hours across periods is a function of changes in wages but, importantly, the discount rate and market rate 









1 ln ρ  so long as ρ  < r and decrease at a rate equal to αI as log disutility of work increases.  
Empirically, Equation (6) tells us that we need to control for changes in the disutility of work in order to 
produce an unbiased estimate of αI.  We discuss this point further in Section 6, where we develop an 
empirical specification of Equation (6).   8
4. The  NBDS 
The NBDS is a nationally representative, household panel survey of Social Security beneficiaries 
who first received benefits between mid-1980 and mid-1981.
4  The first wave was fielded in 1982.  A 
second survey of the 1982 respondents or surviving spouses was fielded in 1991.  The data contain 
extensive information on demographic, employment, martial, health, and wealth characteristics. 
A major advantage of the NBDS for our purposes is the availability of matched administrative 
files of yearly covered earnings from 1951 to 1991.  These data allow us to examine the earnings of 
individuals who are subject to the Social Security earnings test over time and without error.
5  In 
particular, it is exactly the earnings that are reported to the Social Security administration that matter for 
the earnings test.  Moreover, because these data provide panel information, we can directly examine how 
an individual’s behavior changes as the tax rate changes. 
Our analysis focuses on the 9,519 individuals in the NBDS who were new beneficiaries of retired 
worker benefits during the sample selection period (mid-1980 through mid-1981) and qualified for these 
benefits based on their own earnings history.  We focus on these individuals because they are the most 
likely to have a substantial attachment to the labor force and so respond to the incentives of the earnings 
test.  We further limit our analysis to those individuals who were born in the years 1913 through 1919, 
which guarantees that we observe an individual’s retired earnings for at least one year during their 60s. 
This restriction leaves us with 8,725 respondents.  
Respondents in our sample were between 63 and 69 in 1982 and 72 and 78 in 1991.  A little more 
than half of the sample (55 percent) is male; 77 percent are married and 12 percent is either black or 
Hispanic.  Respondents have an average of 11 years of education.  It is important to note that our sample 
excludes individuals receiving disability and those who qualify for retirement benefits by virtue of their 
spouse’s earnings history.  Consequently, it is likely that our sample is more likely to work past 
retirement than the general population.     
5. Descriptive  Analysis  of Elderly Labor Supply 
Before turning to a formal analysis of intertemporal substitution in the NBDS, we first present a 
broader picture of who in the NBDS is likely to be affected by the earnings test.  About 22 percent of the 
sample is still working at age 69 (Figure 2), and so the elimination of the earnings test at age 70 can at 
best induce substitution among a small number of individuals.  In Figure 2, we graph the fraction of 
                                                      
4 The NBDS also contains a representative sampling of persons ages 65 and over who were entitled to Medicare 
benefits but whose earnings prevented them from receiving Social Security benefits as of July 1982.  We do not 
analyze these respondents in the present draft. 
5 The administrative earnings data are reported to four digits of significance, so in the neighborhood of the earnings 
test, we observe social security earnings to the dollar.   9
respondents with positive Social Security earnings between ages 60 and 78.
6  At age 60, 80 percent of the 
sample has positive Social Security earnings.  This percentage falls by 12 percentage points between ages 
61 and 63 and another 23 percentage points between ages 64 and 66.  After age 66, the fraction with 
positive earnings fall at an average rate of about two percentage points per year.  
Figure 2 also graphs indices of hours/week, weeks/year, and total hours/year between ages 64 and 
78.  These indices are constructed using self-reports of hours and weeks worked between 1983 and 1991.  
Because they were collected retrospectively, these hours and weeks data are likely to be measured with 
greater error than in data sets like the CPS and HRS.  Conditional on working at all, hours and weeks 
worked change relatively little between ages 64 and 74.  Weeks/year drop sharply after age 74.  
Hours/week, weeks/year, and total hours per year fall by 4.0, 3.7, and 5.5 percent, respectively between 
ages 64 and 74.  The average number of hours/week and weeks/year worked for those working at age 69 
is 29 and 41.  Haider and Loughran (2001) using CPS data also note that hours and weeks of work decline 
relatively little among those who do work between ages 65 and 74.   It may be that elderly workers would 
like to work fewer hours, but cannot due to fixed employment costs.  Only 11 percent of queried 
respondents, however, stated they would have preferred to work fewer hours. 
For the remainder of this section we focus on two subpopulations: those who work at least one 
year after age 69 (workers) and those who do not (non-workers), where working is defined by positive 
Social Security earnings.  Respondents who did not work after age 69 comprise 77 percent of the total 
sample.  55 percent of these respondents did not work at all between 1983 and 1991, 6 percent worked 
during at least one of those years, 25 percent died during those years, and 12 percent were not interviewed 
in 1991 for other reasons.   
In 1991, the NBDS asked respondents who did not work at all between 1983 and 1991, why they 
chose not to.  We tabulate those responses in Panel A of Table 1.  As can be seen, 79 percent of these 
non-workers chose not to work because they had retired or because they did not want to work.  Another 
17 percent stated that they were too ill or disabled to work or did not work for family reasons.  Only one 
percent did not work because no suitable jobs were available.  In Panel B of  Table 1 we itemized the 
reasons why respondents who did work sometime during 1983 and 1991 left their last job.   Again, we see 
that the dominant reason for leaving their last job was wanting to retire (38 percent), poor health (25 
percent), or their spouse’s poor health (8 percent).  About 14 percent of the sample left their last job 
because of poor business conditions, low wages, not liking the job, or to search for a better job.   
The 1991 wave of the NBDS also asked these non-working respondents whether they would be 
willing to take a job if offered.  Only 10 percent said that they would be willing to work if offered a job.   
                                                      
6 We translate yearly Social Security earnings observations into age-specific observations using June as the cutoff in 
any given year.   10
The minimum wage these individuals would demand averaged $7.20 per hour.  This compares to a mean 
wage of  $x.x/hours for individuals ages 72 to 78 who report working in the CPS in 1991 and $x.x/hour 
for individuals ages 66 to 71. 
In Table 2 we tabulate responses to the question, why did you take your last job?  In Column A, 
we tabulate those responses for individuals who worked between in 1983 and 1991, but who did not work 
after age 69.  Financial need or wanting to raise living standards was the most important reason for taking 
the last job for 34 percent of these respondents.  Simply wanting to work counted as the most important 
reason for another 32 percent.  We see similar percentages in Column B for the sample of respondents 
working after age 69.  These individuals, however, were somewhat more likely to say they took their last 
job because they wanted to work (42 v. 32 percent).   
Perhaps the most significant difference between respondents who worked after age 69 and those 
who did not is health.  First, 25 percent of the sample not working after age 69 died before age 70.  For 
those still living in 1991, self-reported health among those working after age 69 is substantially higher 
than for those not working after age 69.  This can be seen in Table 3 where 36 percent of those working 
after age 69 report their health as being excellent or very good, compared to 26 percent of those not 
working.  Workers are more likely than non-workers to report their health as superior relative to others 
their age as well (58 v 46 percent).  As expected, workers are less likely to report that their health limits 
the kind or amount of work they can do (29 v. 41 percent). 
While based on self-reports, the answers to these questions suggest that individuals who stop 
working after age 69 do so primarily because they do not want to work any more or because their health 
forces them to stop work.  Revealing is the fact that only ten percent of the sample not working after age 
69 would be willing to take a job even if it offered desirable wages and hours.  We take this as evidence 
that rising disutility of work drives exit from the labor force.  Curiously, for those who do work, we do 
not see much evidence that hours or weeks of work decline significantly between ages 66 and 74; 
moreover, only 11 percent of queried respondents reported they would prefer to work fewer hours, 
suggesting hours constraints related to fixed working costs is not keeping hours higher than they 
otherwise would be.  Those individuals remaining in the labor force after age 69 are healthier than those 
who do not and are somewhat more likely to report that they work simply because they want to. 
6.  The Impact of the Earnings Test on Labor Supply 
We begin our examination of intertemporal substitution by looking for graphical evidence that 
individuals subject to the earnings test choose earnings near the earnings limit (point a in Figure 1), an 
approach used by Friedberg (2000) and others.  This analysis focuses on those individuals with positive   11
earnings in at least one year after age 65  40 percent of the respondents in our sample.  In all of the 
analyses that follow, we exclude the entire year of earnings if an individual dies in that year.   
Figure 3 presents the histogram of earnings relative to the earnings test by age.  We generate the  
tabulations for this figure using respondents with positive earnings within 100 percent of the earnings test. 
The figure demonstrates that there is a distinct spike in the fraction of respondents with earnings within 
10 percent below the earnings test for the two ages covered by the test (ages 67 and 69) but there is no 
such spike for those ages not covered by the test (ages 71 and 73).  These results are more distinct than 
Friedberg’s, especially in the relative drop in earnings after the earnings test.  However, because the 
earnings test was between $6,000 and $9,720 in the years we examine, the 10 percent bands used in 
Figure 3 are not much more precise than Friedberg’s $1,000 bands. 
In Figure 4, we narrow our earning bands to intervals of 2.5 percentage points.  Once again, the 
figure demonstrates that there is a distinct spike in the fraction of respondents who have earnings just 
below the earnings test, but this figure shows that the spike is driven by people locating within 2.5 percent 
of the earnings test. For example, for the 1988 earnings test of $8,400, this band implies that an unusually 
large fraction of individuals locate within $210 below the earnings test.  These data suggest that at least 
some individuals had both precise knowledge of the earnings test and the ability to choose their earnings 
with precision.  At the same time, some individuals locate on areas of the budget constraint just above the 
earnings test, behavior that is at odds with the theoretical predictions.  Given that our data are measured 
without error, this provides evidence of the dangers in only using non-convexities in the budget constraint 
when measuring labor supply.
7 
Importantly, Friedberg is able to examine a question with her data that we are unable to examine.  
Friedberg examines how individuals respond to two different law changes.  A 1983 law removed the 
earnings test for individuals ages 70 to 71 and a 1990 law reduced the marginal tax rate for those ages 65 
to 69 from 50 to 33 percent.  Friedberg estimates an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.32 at the sample 
means, under the assumption that both of these law changes were unanticipated by the worker and thus 
represented a positive income shock.  Because Friedberg does not rely on a life-cycle model, her elasticity 
does not strictly correspond to those discussed in the previous section, but it does provide a lower bound 
for the intertemporal labor supply elasticity characterized by Equation (5). 
                                                      
7 In standard formulations of models that use non-convexities in the budget set, it is presumed that measurement 
error explains why individuals would locate just above the earnings test.  See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a 
discussion of these issues.   12
Our panel data, however, can be used to examine how individuals respond to the known change 
in the after-tax wage between ages 69 and 70.
8  The basic prediction of the model is that individuals 
choosing earnings at or above the earnings limit at age 69 will increase their labor supply between ages 69 
and 70, all else equal.  To examine this prediction, we group individuals who are 66 to 68, 69 and 70, and 
71 to 73.
9  For each group, we then compute the mean percent change in earnings from this year to the 
next by earnings bands relative to the earnings test in the first period.  We present these results in Figure 
5. 
Figure 5 shows that earnings growth is negative across most of the earnings distribution for all 
three age groups.  Individuals age 69 or 70 with earnings near the earnings test, though, experience a 
slight positive increase in earnings as the earnings test is eliminated.  The relative increase in earnings for 
these individuals is even more evident when compared to the changes in earnings for other age groups 
who choose earnings near the earnings test.  The theory also predicts that individuals who choose 
earnings above the earnings test should also experience a relative increase in earnings growth when the 
earnings test is eliminated.  We do not observe this in Figure 5, however.   
We turn to a regression framework in order to formally estimate an intertemporal labor supply 
elasticity using the earnings test.  To do this, we make several modifications to Equation (6).  Note first 
that the first-difference of the logarithm of pre-tax earnings (i.e., what we observe in our administrative 
data) is,
10 
  ∆t lnE =∆ t lnh(W
τ )+∆ t lnW , (7) 
where 
τ W  represents after-tax wages.  By assuming that the pre-tax wage does not change between 
adjacent periods, this expression implies that we can study changes in earnings to make inferences about 
changes in hours.  Second, the assumption that the pre-tax wage does not change between adjacent years 
also implies that the after-tax wage will systematically change only as an individual ages past the earnings 
test and is in the relevant range of earnings in the initial year.  Specifically, as someone turns age 70 and 
                                                      
8 Other recent studies of the earnings test rely on cross-sectional data [Baker and Benjamin 1999; Friedberg 2000; 
Gruber and Orszag 2000].  See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a discussion of when cross-sectional data can be 
used to estimate an intertemporal elasticity. 
9 Up to this point, we have ignored the fact that we observe earnings for calendar years, not age years.  For the 
calendar year in which an individual turns 70, earnings in months before the birthday month are subject to the 
earnings test but earnings in subsequent months are not.  To construct our data, we label an individual’s age as the 
age that a person will be on the last day of the year.  Thus, for someone with a December birthday, we would expect 
that the main impact of the earnings test would be between the years they are 70 and 71, not between the years they 
are 69 and 70.  For people who have a birthday in the middle of the year, we would expect to observe half the 
impact in each year.  Therefore, for this analysis, we group together those individuals who are 69 and 70. 
10 Although hours worked are asked retrospectively in our data, we believe that these would be measured with much 
error.  Instead we adopt an approach that focuses on earnings.   13
has earnings just above the earnings test, the change in the after-tax wage will simply be equal to 0.69 
( ) 1 ln( 0 τ − − ), given the 50 percent tax rate in effect during the 1980s.  Third, rather than specify the 
dependent variable to be the first difference of log-earnings, we instead use the percent change in 
earnings.  This substitution allows us to include individuals who leave the labor force between periods. 
Given these assumptions and, for the moment, ignoring changes in the disutility of work (∆tΥ2), 
the reduced-form equation that corresponds to Equation (6) is 
  %∆tEi = β0 + β1(AGE69it *0.69*AFFECTEDit)+εit, (8) 
where AGE69 is a dummy variable for those who are 69 (turning 70 in the following year) and AFFECTED 
is a dummy variable for someone who is in the affected range of the earnings distribution.
11  The reduced-
































This estimating equation is similar to that employed by MaCurdy (1981).  As in Lee (2001), we can 
interpret the error term, εit, as forecasting error (i.e., individuals do not perfectly anticipate all the factors 
that might affect their marginal utility of wealth in each period).  
The primary issue that remains is to specify how the disutility of work changes over the life cycle.  
Previous studies have generally adopted specifications that allow for little systematic change in the 
disutility of work, consistent with their focus on prime-aged individuals.  For example, MaCurdy (1981), 
Altonji (1986) and Lee (2001) estimate first-differenced models of hour changes (similar to Equation (8)).  
MaCurdy includes no other regressors.  Altonji includes age and time fixed effects in some models, and 
Lee only includes time-fixed effects. Similarly, Bover (1989) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) estimate the 
labor supply equation in levels (see Equation (4)), with the former only including age and the number of 
children and the latter also including health status.  Importantly, the level specification would need to 









1 ln ρ  in the level model. 
                                                      
11 To account for the differences between calendar year and age year (see footnote 9), we create a dummy variable 
that is a linear combination of the AGE69 and AGE70 dummy variables, where the weights of the linear combination 
are based on the fraction of the year they were a given age.  We use this variable rather than the AGE69 variable in 
all of our regressions.  We also ignore the upper limit of the earnings test, the point at which all benefits are taxed 
away, because it is relevant for very few individuals in our sample.   14
Because we focus on older workers, we are explicit in allowing the disutility of work to vary with 
age.  If we posit that the disutility of work changes linearly with age, then the intercept of the reduced-
form model in Equation (8) would change with the addition of another term in the intercept, but the slope 
term would still measure the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  If we instead parameterize the level 
of disutility of work as a quadratic in age, then we need to include age in Equation (8) to isolate the 
intertemporal elasticity as the slope on AGE69.  We present results for both specifications for age and with 
and without time fixed effects in Table 4.  Specifically, we estimate the regression 
  %∆tEi = β0 + β1(AGE69it *0.69*AFFECTEDit)+ β2AFFECTEDit + Xitβ3 +εit, (10) 
where AFFECTED is defined as having earnings within twenty percent of the earnings test and X may 
include time dummies and age entered linearly.
12 
Missing from Equation (6) is mortality, which, in this population, may be changing rapidly.  
Mortality is often included in models of elderly consumption, savings, and bequests [e.g., Hurd 1989], but 
is typically left out of labor supply models.  As Yaari (1965) and others have noted, the mortality hazard 
plays a role similar to the subjective rate of discount.  Intuitively, intertemporal substitution is less likely 
if individuals perceive lower expected returns to consumption in later periods because of rising mortality.  
Thus, mortality risk would tend to cause more substitution across periods. 
Formally, let as|t be the probability that an individual is alive at time s conditional on being alive 
at time t.  This mortality risk can then be incorporated into Equation (1) in the usual expected utility 
framework,  
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This objective function implies the following labor supply equation, 
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which suggests individuals are more willing to substitute labor supply across periods as mortality rises.  If 
mortality risk increases at an exponential rate, then the effect of the mortality hazard will be captured as 
part of the age effect in the specification of Equation (10). 
 Turning to the results, the elasticity estimates are similar across the models.  The intertemporal 
elasticity varies from 0.28 to 0.36.  However, the standard errors are over twice as large as the point 
                                                      
12 In results not presented here, we run the model without the primary effect AFFECTED, vary the definition of 
AFFECTED, and exclude individuals who have zero earnings in either year.  The substantive results do not change.   15
estimates in each case.  These imprecise estimates are despite the sample size of over 12,000 observations 
and a dependent variable measured without error.  
To interpret these results, we first note that the standard life-cycle labor supply model suggests 
that the intertemporal elasticity does not vary by age.  Our estimate of approximately 0.32 is somewhat 
lower than that obtained for younger populations in previous studies.  For example, Lee (2001) obtains an 
estimate of approximately 0.5 using a approach that corrects for finite sample bias arising from weak 
instruments.  Pistaferri (2002) obtains an estimate of approximately 0.7 relying on subjective reports of 
future wage growth. 
We can also compare our findings to that of Friedberg (2000).  She estimates that the 
uncompensated wage elasticity based on changes in the earnings test is 0.32.  Although such an estimate 
cannot be compared directly to our intertemporal elasticity, it must be a lower bound [see Blundell and 
MaCurdy 1999).  Our estimates are very similar to Friedberg’s, a finding that suggest a small, perhaps 
implausibly small, wealth response. 
Baker and Benjamin (1999) find that the elimination of the earnings test in Canada induced no 
change in reported hours of work, but did induce some individuals to shift from part-year, full-time work 
to full-year, full-time work.  They interpret this discrete change in labor supply in response to the 
elimination of the earnings test as evidence of labor market rigidities that prevent continuous changes in 
hours.  To check for this possibility in our data, we estimated Equation (10) with the dependent variable 
equal to one for individuals with zero earnings in year t and positive earnings in year t+1 and equal to 
zero otherwise.  We see no evidence of discrete changes in labor supply between ages 69 and 70 using 
this specification.   
7. Conclusions 
The recent repeal of the Social Security earnings test for individuals ages 65 to 69 was motivated 
at least in part by a concern that this rule leveled an unfair penalty on older workers and unnecessarily 
reduced their labor supply.
13  We find mixed evidence that the labor supply of elderly workers subject to 
the earning test responds to the increase in after tax wages between ages 69 and 70.  When examining 
earnings levels for those ages 66 to 69, we see significant "bunching" around the earnings test.  Such 
bunching is predicted by standard labor supply theory and has been noted in previous studies using self-
reported earnings data.  The administrative earnings data in the NBDS allow us to identify the bunching 
more precisely.  We find that this bunching occurs very close to the earnings test, mostly within 2.5 
percent below the earnings limit.  This finding suggests that a sizable fraction of individuals have 
sufficient flexibility in their work to achieve specific earnings targets.  We also find evidence that some 
                                                      
13 Echoing these concerns, the law was entitled, “The Senior Citizen’s Freedom to Work Act.”    16
individuals locate just above the earnings test, which is at odds with a standard model of life-cycle labor 
supply.  On the other hand, we find little evidence of systematic increases in labor supply as individuals 
age from 69 to 70 and the earnings test is removed.  Given the high-quality nature of our earnings data 
and reasonably large sample size, we believe this second finding indicates the elderly in fact do not make 
large substitutions in labor supply across periods even when after-tax wages change sharply as they do 
between ages 69 and 70.   
We are left with several possible explanations for these contradictory findings.  One possibility is 
simply that elderly workers do not care much about wages.  Other factors, rising disutility of work in 
particular, drive decisions to change hours or exit the labor force at older ages.  Responses to subjective 
questions in the NBDS regarding decisions to work or not work are consistent with this interpretation.   
The vast majority of individuals who do not work report they do not work because they no longer want to 
work and would be unwilling to work even if offered a job with amenable hours and wages.   Poor health 
is clearly an important factor pushing elderly workers out of the labor force. 
This does not necessarily explain our finding of a statistically insignificant intertemporal labor 
supply elasticity, however.  Another interpretation, then, is that we have failed to adequately control for 
rising disutility of work with our age effects.  In subsequent work, we will exploit the recent elimination 
of the earnings test to estimate both parametric and intertemporal labor supply elasticities simultaneously.  
This law change, which affected all individuals ages 65 to 69, coupled with longitudinal data on earnings, 
will allow us to control for age effects, and hence, disutility of work, more convincingly.   
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Figure 1  The Earnings Test and Labor Supply 
 










Figure 2Labor Force Participation, Hours, and Weeks Worked by Age 
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Notes:  The results graphed in this figure are based on 1,843, 1,802, 1,335, and 963 observations for the 67, 69, 71, 
and 73 age groups, respectively.  Data Source:  NBDS. 
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Notes:  The results graphed in this figure are based on 473, 481, 243, and 151 observations for the 67, 69, 71, and 73 
year olds, respectively.  Data Source:  NBDS.   23
















































































































Note:  The results graphed in this figure are based on 4,696, 3,410, and 3,468 observations for the 66 to 68 age 
group, 69 to 70 age group, and 71 to 73 age group, respectively.  Data source: NBDS. 
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Table 1  Most Important Reason for Not 
Working/Leaving Last Job 
Reason Fraction 
A. Reason not working 1983-91 (n=3,666) 
Personal, family reasons  0.03 
Ill or disabled, unable to work  0.14 
Did not want to work  0.05 
Retired 0.74 
No suitable jobs available  0.01 
Labor dispute  0.00 
Other 0.03 
B. Reason left last job (n=339) 
Lost job  0.06 
Business bad  0.04 
Pay too low  0.01 
Disliked job  0.03 
Transportation problem  0.01 
Moved 0.02 
To get Social Security  0.03 
Apply for SS disability  0.00 
Avoid cutoff of benefits  0.00 
To keep Medicate  0.00 
To get a pension  0.00 
To care for others  0.04 
To get a better job  0.00 
Spouse retired  0.04 
Spouse health changed  0.04 
Wanted to retire  0.38 
Compulsory retirement  0.03 
Health problems  0.25 
Notes: Sample restricted to respondents not working after age 
69.  Data source: NBDS.   25











Financial need  0.34  0.35 
Raise standard of living  0.04  0.04 
Buy item  0.01  0.01 
Want to work  0.32  0.42 
Found job  0.00  0.00 
Health now allows  0.01  0.01 
Spouse health changed  0.00  0.01 
Rehab. Enabled work  0.00  0.00 
Raise Social Security  0.03  0.02 
Raise pension  0.01  0.00 
Social security stopped  0.00  0.00 
Medicare not affected  0.00  0.00 
Other reason  0.25  0.15 
    
n  167 845 
Data source: NBDS.   26
Table 3  Subjective Health 
  Did Not Work  
After Age 69 
Worked After 
Age 69 
A. Subjective health assessment 
Excellent 0.09  0.13 
Very good  0.17  0.23 
Good 0.30  0.31 
Fair 0.27  0.23 
Poor 0.16  0.10 
B. Health compared to others 
Better 0.46  0.58 
Same 0.41  0.34 
Worse 0.13  0.08 
C. Work limitations     
Any work limitation  0.41  0.29 
Work limitation 
prevents all work 
0.73 0.67 
    
n  4,258 1,540 
Data source: NBDS.   27
Table 4  Regression Estimates of the Intertemporal Labor Supply Elasticity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















Year-effects  No Yes No Yes 
      
R
2  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Notes: The regressions are based on each person/year that we observe after 1981, that are 
between the ages 66 and 73 (inclusive) and have positive earnings in an initial year, and that 
are alive the entire following year. The dependent variable is the percent change in earnings 
from the initial year to the following year. See Equation (10).  The regressions are based on 
12,541 observations. The regressions are weighted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Data 
source: NBDS. 
 
 
 